Abstract: Tort lawyers have occasionally asked themselves the question, 'What is the place of public transport in the development of tort law?' But here I ask the question in reverse, namely, what is the place of tort law in the public transport system? That is, in what ways and to what extent does tort law function to deliver the goals of the public transport system, which may be thought of as providing mobility without injuring people? I take as an example the British railway system, tracing out the inputs into the system, the processes within it and the outputs from it and attempt to place tort law among its inputs. That gives us a glimpse of how tort law might influence outputs both directly and indirectly. The answer to the question seems to be, at least as a first approximation, that tort law, operating alongside and as part of a system of information flows and incentives, is likely to be more significant for the more peripheral parts in the system than for the organisations immediately concerned with delivering the service.
I Introduction
Tort lawyers have occasionally asked themselves the question, 'What is the place of public transport in the development of tort law?' 1 That is a good and important question, which is again taken up in other contributions to this special edition. But I here want to ask the question in reverse, namely, what is the place of tort law in the public transport system? That is, in what ways and to what extent does tort law function to deliver the goals of the public transport system? That question suggests another, namely, what happens to our understanding of tort law if we treat it as part of a wider system and not as the system itself? I propose to attempt answers to these questions using a single example, in the hope that it will light the way to a more general answer. That example is the railway system of Great Britain, an example chosen not only for the familiarity of the relevant law but also because the system itself is, both organisationally and technologically, very complex, so that understanding it should give useful clues as to how to understand less complex systems.
The article proceeds first by making some remarks about how to think about systems that include both human and technological elements and how law might fit into such systems, followed by some thoughts on how lawyers might learn from engineers about how to think about accidents as an undesired output of a system, rather than as just a result of individual human mistakes. It then looks at the British railway system in terms of its inputs, processes, and outputs, taking them in reverse order and ending with tort law as an input. It culminates with an attempt to bring all the preceding information together into a single system and to draw some conclusions about the place of tort law in the system.
II Systems and tort law
The word 'system' has several different meanings and connotations. Some legal scholars have taken up its use in biology and taken it to mean a self-organising or self-maintaining set of elements.
2 I am not using it in that sense here. By 'system' I mean the less ambitious and less restrictive meaning of the term used by engineers, namely 'an array of components designed to accomplish a particular objective according to a plan'.
3 Such a system might have recursions and feedbacks that help to maintain it in a working state, or it might not. It is defined instead first by its objectives, by what those designing it want it to achieveincluding what they want to avoid happening in the course of achieving those objectives -and secondly by its form, which might or might not in the end achieve those objectives. 4 The main goal of public transport systems is, uncontroversially, to move people to places they want to move to, in other words, to provide mobility. But in the course of providing mobility, they aim to avoid injuring people.
A system's form can be analysed in terms of inputs, processes and outputs. Systems take an input and apply a process to it, which produces an output. Each of the components of a system can also be analysed as a system (a 'subsystem'), coupling an input with an output via a process, with many components taking as their input the output of other components. 5 Some of those subsystems might be machines, devices or apparatus but some consist of human beings or organisations of human beings. Taken together such a system is not just a collection of designed objects ('technical objects') and the connections between them but also the connections between technical objects and people: it is 'sociotechnical', not just 'technical'. 6 The relevance of law in this kind of system is that the inputs used by human beings and human organisations include rules, of which legal rules form part. Indeed, one way of thinking about law is that it is a kind of nonmaterial technical object itself. 7 Here we are treating tort law as a subsystem of the public transport system. The question is what part it plays as a component in that system, and so the objectives that ultimately count are those of the public transport system, not those of tort law. This is important because we can for these purposes bracket out the wider debate about the objectives of tort law itself, a particularly difficult debate in the United Kingdom because of the large role still played in tort law by the common law, the purposes of which are inherently controversial. 8 One way to understand the situation is to see tort law as a complex component with a variety of inputs and outputs, some of which are planned or designed in the engineering sense and some are not. The relevant inputs are legislation, which is usually designed to have desired effects, common law, whose purposes are difficult to describe and might not exist, and disputes between individuals, in which the relevant plans are those of the individuals themselves, which are many and various. The outputs are also many and various, but immediately relevant ones are (a) behavioural effects on individuals (including non-litigants), which we can summarise as 'deterrents', (b) information about how the injury in the case came about, (c) justice between the parties and (d) support (usually financial) for injured victims. This is summarised in figure 1: In terms of the public transport system, the relevant outputs of tort law are deterrents and information about how accidents happen, being the two outputs relevant to mobility without injury. Other outputs of the tort system might be important in other contexts, for example if we were asking about the place of tort in the justice system or the social security system, but neither justice nor social security is a planned goal of the public transport system.
III Accidents
Lawyers tend to see accidents as resulting from individual errors, but behind those individual errors lies a system of managing people and technology that creates the conditions in which errors are more or less likely to happen. Analysing safety in terms of systems is a field of increasing sophistication in engineering. Many engineers describe accidents in terms of multiple coincident failures, an approach known as the 'Swiss Cheese Model'. 9 An accident happens when holes in the subsystems designed to prevent injuries all line up and a risk of injury becomes an actual injury. The Swiss Cheese Model's main advantage is that it allows analysts to think about safety systems and individual errors at the same time.
11 It does have some disadvantages. It looks backwards rather than forwards, which might give a misleading impression of how easy the processes and interactions between them are to understand.
12 It seems to imply, at least in its original form, that accidents happen through sequential failures when they often happen through simultaneous failures. And it also gives only an implicit account of the whole system, concentrating on the elements that contribute to reducing or increasing risk.
13 But more comprehensive forward-looking approaches to systems safety engineering, although theoretically more satisfying, have their own problems, not least that they are difficult to present succinctly and clearly.
14 As a result, the Swiss Cheese Model remains viable and popular. 15 In particular, it remains the recommended approach for rail accident investigators. 16 Applying the Swiss Cheese Model to an accident can produce a complex picture. The standard way of proceeding is to look at six levels or layers: what happened to the equipment; individual decisions; local conditions; risk controls; 10 P Underwood/P Waterson, Systems thinking, the Swiss Cheese Model and accident analysis: A comparative systemic analysis of the Grayrigg train derailment using the ATSB, AcciMap and STAMP models (2014) The Place of Tort Law in the Public Transport System organisational influences and regulatory oversight. 17 Simplifying that further, we can say that accidents happen because of complex interactions between people and technical objects which, in turn, are influenced by organisational, informational and regulatory conditions. The standard approach, however, tends not to distinguish between different aspects of regulation. If we want to see the place of tort law in the system, we need to separate out the law in its various forms from the mass of regulatory and informational interventions.
Another important point is that accidents are an undesired side effect of the railway system, not the main objective of the system, which is mobility, and so to see the part played by tort law, one needs to see the system that delivers the main objective, not just the parts concerned specifically with preventing the unwanted side effects.
IV The British railway system
We adopt the method of treating the British railway as a system encompassing inputs, processes and outputs. We begin with outputs, since they indicate the possible purposes of the system, before looking at processes -at a high level of abstraction, looking at the structure of organisations rather than the details of how they work internally -and finally inputs, which will include tort law, but only after we have mentioned some other inputs.
A Outputs
We start with the outputs of the railway system, both its main desired output, moving people from place to place, and the unwelcome output we are interested in here, namely, injuries caused by accidents. If we were aiming for a complete account we might also include other unwelcome outputs, for example adverse environmental pollution, both local and global.
Turning first to mobility, the British railway system delivers around 1.7 billion passenger journeys a year, a figure that has been rising since the privatisation of parts of the system in 1994-1997, reversing a previous slow decline (see figure 3 ).
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17 See eg the diagram in Underwood/Waterson (2014) 68 Accident Analysis & Prevention 83, (which has more than 60 separate elements over the six levels). 18 The reference to 'British' here means 'Great Britain', which is to say England, Scotland and Wales. Northern Ireland is organised separately.
Rail represents about 55 % of public transport journeys by distance and 20 % by number of journeys.
19
In terms of safety, several measures are available. The most straightforward is passenger deaths, the number of which over the decade 2007-17 is shown in figure  4 . The number is small, around five a year or 1 for every 340 million journeys. Another measure of safety is the number of passengers injured per year, which over the same period rose to around 5,500 a year, around 250 of which the regulator classifies as 'major'.
The regulator also records and classifies passenger injuries by circumstance. In 2016-2017, for example, nearly half of all injuries came about through slips, trips or falls, a fifth were 'platform edge incidents' and under a tenth collisions with people or objects. In addition to passenger safety data, the regulator also publishes safety data for two other categories of persons: railway workers and members of the public who were not passengers. The average number of railway workers killed each year came to around two, with the number injured slowly falling to around 5800, of which around 160 were 'major'. In the 'public' category, in a pattern very different from that for passengers and workers, fatalities are usually more common than all the other levels of injury added together, running at between 240 and 330 a year over the decade with both major and minor injuries averaging around 80. The explanation is that a very high percentage of the 'public' fatalities, 85 % on the estimation of the regulator, are suicides. But that still leaves around 45 a year, far more than passenger and worker deaths added together. They include, for example, people killed at level crossings.
Another way of measuring safety is the number of incidents that could have caused injury, that is the number of 'accidents'. The total number of accidents seems to have fallen, from above 1200 in 2002-2003 to under 600 in 2016-2017. Incidents the regulator classifies as 'potentially higher risk accidents involving at least one passenger train' also fell from around 35 to around 15. Such numbers are, however, vulnerable to changes in recording practices.
B Processes
A comprehensive list of all the technical and social processes employed by all the components of the railway would be very long and unwieldy. As a very rough approximation, however, one can instead look at the organisational structure of the railway, treating each organisation as a site of processes that result in the outputs in which we are interested. Ultimately the railway runs as a result of a complex interaction between railway staff and technology. Staff are employed by and equipment is under the control of organisations who implement the service. Those organisations in turn procure equipment and work from other organisations. Behind all these organisations lie regulatory bodies.
The infrastructure of the railway -the track, the power supply and the signalling system for example -are the responsibility of Network Rail, in legal form a private company but which distributes no dividends and whose only member is a government minister, the Secretary of State for Transport. The original railway privatisation plan involved creating a fully private infrastructure company, but following a series of failures, including accidents that gave rise to enormous liabilities, the function was transferred to a company under government control.
In contrast, the rolling stock -the carriages and locomotives -is owned by several competing companies, known as Rolling Stock Companies (ROSCOs), most of whom are entirely private sector enterprises. ROSCOs, however, run no train services. The services are run by train operating companies (TOCs), which lease rolling stock from ROSCOs. TOCs generally operate their trains under regional franchises granted by the government (the Department for Transport (DfT)), under regulated contracts with Network Rail for access to the track. Franchises are awarded by competitive bidding, with TOCs bidding based on how much subsidy they would require, or how much financial contribution to government they would make, to run the franchise. Some TOCs operate supplementary services without franchises, directly under track access agreements. Railway stations were originally under the control of the infrastructure company. Some still are but others are operated by TOCs or by joint ventures.
Network Rail, TOCs and ROSCOs are not the end of the story. Network Rail largely operates not through its own employees but by outsourcing functions to contractors, often very large construction and facilities companies. In addition, ROSCOs do not build their own rolling stock. They buy it from a variety of international manufacturers -currently Alstom, Bombardier, Hitachi and Siemens.
Behind the organisations that in their various ways operate the railway, lie several governmental and regulatory bodies. DfT, in addition to deciding on franchises, subsidises Network Rail's infrastructure operation. The Office of Rail and Road (ORR) is the principal regulator of the railway, both for economic matters and for safety. 21 The Railway Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) is an independent investigator charged with determining, without attributing blame, the causes of railway accidents. 22 The Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) is, despite its official-sounding name, a voluntary body with members from across the industry that pursues safety through research and establishing technical standards.
C Inputs
On the human side of the sociotechnical system, the main inputs affecting safety are the management of human beings and the design of technical objects. As the Swiss Cheese Model suggests, accidents are likely to occur when management failure coincides with technical failure. But feeding into both management and design are other inputs, particularly money, information and standards, and law.
Money
Money comes into the railway system largely through ticket sales (about £9.5 billion a year) and through subsidy (about £11 billion a year net). 23 TOCs, ROSCOs, contractors and manufacturers are all private sector companies presumably motivated to maximise profits. That does not mean, however, that they inevitably skimp on safety in pursuit of lowering costs. Serious accidents involving multiple fatalities might be expected to lower ticket sales through reputational effects or to increase costs through prompting regulatory intervention.
Network Rail, as a state-owned corporation, is not subject to shareholder pressure to maximise profit but it can come under financial pressure from governments seeking to reduce public expenditure.
Information can add to technical knowledge and so help to improve design, or it can add to knowledge about human behaviour and so help to improve management. Standards help to diffuse that new knowledge. Some of the information might be generated from data outputted by the system itself, forming a feedback loop.
Collection and diffusion of information about safety occurs in three principal ways. First, the industry collaborates in the voluntary production of safety standards through the RSSB, with information flowing from the industry to the RSSB and standards flowing back. Second, regulatory bodies, both ORR and RAIB, collect information about safety, investigate accidents and make recommendations. ORR concentrates on Network Rail and TOCs, which are the principal targets of its regulatory powers.
24 RAIB ranges wider, over the full range of possible causes of accidents. 25 Information also flows between DfT and TOCs and Network Rail, although DfT's role is mainly to financial and so only indirectly relates to safety. Third, information flows between companies during their commercial dealings with one another, for example between ROSCOs and manufacturers, Network Rail and its contractors and TOCs and Network Rail. 
Law
The areas of law most relevant to the safety of the rail system are criminal law, contract and tort. 27 We begin with criminal law before moving on to contract and then, finally, tort.
a Criminal Law Two parts of the criminal law are relevant to rail safety. The first comes under the investigatory and prosecutorial jurisdiction of ORR, the second under the investigatory jurisdiction of the police (often that of the railway's specialist police force, the British Transport Police
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) and the prosecutorial jurisdiction of the Crown Prosecution Service.
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ORR's main criminal law powers arise from health and safety at work legislation, 30 which covers not only incidents in which employers have exposed their employees to the risk of injury, 31 but also those in which they have exposed to such a risk 'persons not in [the employer's] employment', 32 a category that includes customers and the general public.
33 Employers' responsibilities expressly extend to how they use 'premises', which in turn expressly includes 'vehicles'. 34 The standard of liability under the Act is 'reasonable practicality', a form of negligence not requiring proof of intention or recklessness. Section 40 of the Act goes further, placing the burden of proof for the reasonable practicality issue on defendants, resulting in a regime not far from strict liability.
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The government can also make regulations under the 1974 Act providing for detailed duties in specific industries, contravention of which is itself criminal.
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The relevant regulations for the railway industry are mainly contained in the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006.
37 They provide for a mixture of behavioural duties, process duties and duties to obtain and maintain safety certification from ORR. An example of a behavioural duty is: 38 [to] have in place arrangements to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that a safety critical worker under his management, supervision or control does not carry out safety critical work in circumstances where he is so fatigued or where he would be liable to become so fatigued that his health or safety or the health or safety of other persons on a transport system could be significantly affected.
An example of a process duty is: 39 so far as is reasonably practicable, [to] ensure that a person under his management, supervision or control ... only carries out safety critical work where-(a) that person has been assessed as being competent and fit to carry out that work following an assessment by an assessor; (b) there is an accurate and up to date record in writing of that person's competence and fitness which references any criteria for determining competence and fitness against which that assessment of competence was made.
An example of a certification duty is: 40 no person shall operate a train in relation to any infrastructure on the mainline railway unless-(a) he has established and is maintaining a safety management system which meets the requirements set out in regulation 5(1) to (3); and (b) he holds a current safety certificate in relation to the operation in question.
ORR is also empowered to turn recommendations of RAIB arising out of accident inquiries into requirements for specific persons to take specific actions, failure to comply with which is a criminal offence. 41 The penalties available for violations of duties under the 1974 Act include fines without limit and up to two years' imprisonment. Punishments may be levied against both corporate bodies and any corporate 'director, manager, secretary or other similar officer' who consented to or connived at the breach of duty or The Place of Tort Law in the Public Transport System if the employer's breach was attributable to their neglect. 42 In addition, each employee is subject to a duty 'to take reasonable care for the health and safety of himself and of other persons who may be affected by his acts or omissions at work'. 43 Fines can now amount to millions of pounds. In September 2016, for example, Network Rail was fined £4 million for breaches of sec 3 that resulted in a fatality at a pedestrian level crossing. 44 Criminal offences under the jurisdiction of the police and the Crown Prosecution Service include railway-specific offences, such as controlling the movement of a train while intoxicated, 45 and general offences. The most serious of the general offences are gross negligence manslaughter and corporate manslaughter. Gross negligence manslaughter is a common law crime committed where a person breaches a duty of care (which is, to say, breach of a duty of care in tort law) causing a death in circumstances in which it was reasonably foreseeable that a serious and obvious risk of death would exist and where the defendant's conduct was in all the circumstances so reprehensible that it amounted to a crime. b Contract Contract law is relevant because it regulates both relationships within the rail industry and between the industry and its customers. Within the industry, DfT and Network Rail contract with the TOCs. Network Rail contracts with its outsourced suppliers. TOCs contract with ROSCOs and ROSCOs contract with rolling stock manufacturers. Furthermore, contracts of employment, controlled by employment law, regulate relationships between all the organisations and their employees. 48 Contract might be thought of principally as in input that helps to achieve the system's main objective, namely mobility. Contracts are part of how the system is organised to operate successfully. Contracts are, however, also relevant to safety. Within the industry they are relevant in two ways. First their explicit and implied terms might include promises about safety. For example, the supply of railway carriages and engines by manufacturers to ROSCOs is governed by a statutory implied term about quality that automatically includes a promise about the goods' 'safety'. 49 Similarly, contracts of employment contain express or implied terms under which employers and employees give mutual promises about safety. 50 Second, contracts between commercial entities might contain terms shifting risks of liability, especially their tort liability. 51 Turning to the relationship between the industry and its customers, passengers make contracts when they buy their tickets. Since the 19th century courts have interpreted those contracts as containing an implied term that passengers are entitled to reasonable care (but not strict liability) in the way they are transported, applying that standard to all aspects of their journeys. 52 The Place of Tort Law in the Public Transport System law applies only in the simplest of cases, namely where a passenger is injured on a train controlled in all respects by the railway company that sold the ticket. Where passengers buy tickets from one railway company entitling them to complete their journey on a train run by a different company, English contract law, because it uses a strict version of the doctrine of privity, treats only the relationship between passengers and the first company as contractual. To sue the second company for injuries suffered in an accident, passengers have always had to rely on tort. Similarly, if an accident comes about through defects in infrastructure owned by a different company or in rolling stock manufactured by a different company, passenger have rights only in tort. It might have been possible to treat the first company as acting as an agent for the second or for the infrastructure company, but that would have risked importing complications from the law of agency. As a result, using tort law soon became the courts' favoured solution. 53 Even where passengers have a contractual claim they can proceed instead in tort, 54 and in cases in which judges were required to classify the claimant's actions as contract or tort they determined that the action was in tort, with the contract showing only that the passenger had permission to be on the railway. 55 Also, a passenger whose ticket has been bought by someone else (a parent or an employer, for example) was always treated as having no contract with any railway company and so had to rely on tort. 56 The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, which allows a third party to enforce a term contained in a contract made between others as long as those parties intended to confer that benefit, might occasionally apply, but another condition of its application is that the third party must be expressly referred to in the contract, which would normally not be the case for railway tickets. (Moreover, the 1999 Act makes no difference to the rights of passengers against companies other than the one from which they bought their ticket since it cannot impose burdens on third parties.)
If liability to passengers does arise out of contract it is controlled by consumer protection legislation. Transport services are covered by the protective provisions 
59 But it does not include torts under which personal injury is not recoverable, such as private nuisance, 60 although those torts would become relevant if we were to expand our interest in undesired outputs to adverse environmental effects.
i Tort and crime Before looking at those torts in a more detail we need to recall an important feature of English tort law. English law normally treats criminal law and tort law as separate. We have seen that criminal law sometimes uses concepts and standards taken from tort law, such as using tort standards in manslaughter, but next to no flow occurs in the opposite direction. Statutes creating crimes are presumed not to establish torts, unless the court finds that the crime was established to protect a specific category of person of which the claimant is a member. Crime does feed into tort in one instance, although its anomalous nature is widely recognised. Public nuisance is a common law crime, but, unusually for English law, it gives rise to a tort where the claimant has suffered 'particular damage', which means damage greater than or of a different kind from that suffered by the public generally. Despite some doubts, unlike private nuisance, it still seems to cover personal injury. 63 The crime is committed by anyone who breaches a legal duty where the effect is 'to endanger the life, health, property, morals, or comfort of the public, or to obstruct the public in the exercise or enjoyment of rights common to all'. 64 Public nuisance cannot be used to reverse the effect of the 2013 reform of the Health and Safety at Work Act, since the reformed Act forbids civil liability except where regulations specifically establish it, 65 but it might mean that if some other railway-related crime has been committed and a victim suffers exceptional damage, civil liability might be pursued.
ii Joint and several liability and contribution Another preliminary matter, but, because of the multiplicity of potential defendants in railway cases, one of vital importance for current purposes, is the way English law deals with situations in which more than one defendant is liable for the same damage. The law establishes joint and several liability, that is, regardless of whether or not defendants are liable on the same legal basis, each defendant is liable for the whole loss. 66 Claimants are not required to specify how much of the loss they attribute to each defendant. They can proceed against each defendant for the whole loss or in whatever proportions they choose. Of course, claimants cannot recover more than 100 % of their loss, but the risk of a defen-dant being unable to pay damages falls on the other defendants, not on the claimant.
In a second, and separate, stage of the proceedings, defendants can ask the court to require some defendants to make adjusting payments to other defendants according to what the court thinks 'just and equitable having regard to the extent of that person's responsibility for the damage in question', 67 a process called 'contribution'. That process does not, however, affect claimants in any way.
iii Occupiers' Liability Acts The starting point for tort liability for injuries in rail accidents is, perhaps surprisingly, the main statute governing the tort liability of occupiers of land. That statute, the Occupiers Liability Act 1957, applies not only to premises such as railway stations but expressly to 'the obligations of a person occupying or having control over any fixed or moveable structure, including any vessel, vehicle or aircraft', which includes railway carriages. The Act applies to liability 'in respect of dangers due to the state of the premises or to things done or omitted to be done on them', displacing the common law for all the issues it covers. 68 The standard for liability is reasonable care to keep visitors reasonably safe. 69 Examples might include trip hazards in stations and in carriages, injuries caused by faulty carriage doors and by overcrowding in carriages, and platform edge incidents caused by faulty design of carriages or platforms. 70 It equally applies to accidents at level crossings. 71 The duty under the 1957 Act applies to 'occupiers' of premises, which means anyone who has control over the state of the premises, and thus applies similarly to those with control over the state of vehicles. In principle, that might include anyone who could make the vehicles safer without having to ask permission to intervene. 72 It also can include contractors who have control over premises on which they are working. 73 The Act does not, however, specify what kinds of loss are recoverable, what rules about causation apply and how the quantum of damages is calculated. As a result, the common law tort of negligence's rules apply to these issues. For example, pure economic loss is not recoverable unless the defendant has 'assumed responsibility', 74 and psychiatric injury is recoverable if claimants can show they are 'primary' victims. 75 The common law also prevails for the purposes of the defences of acceptance of risk and contributory negligence. 76 The Act says that the standard can be reached by giving warnings of dangers as well as by eliminating them, 77 but what matters is whether the warning made the visitor reasonably safe. 78 Illegible warnings in small print on tickets, for example, would not suffice.
Entirely separate from warnings are notices restricting liability. These are signs saying things such as 'no liability accepted for damage caused'. They are not warnings because they in no way help to make visitors safer.
79 But in theory they can limit liability even to passengers who have no contractual relationship with the relevant railway company because they put a condition on the passen-
See eg Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 830, [1998] 2 All England Law
Reports (All ER) 577. Generally, 'pure economic loss' means loss suffered solely as the result of the claimant having a contractual or similar relationship with a party that itself suffers recoverable loss, in contrast to 'property damage', which means loss arising out of damage to property owned by the claimant. But note that where the contract in effect establishes the value of the claimant's property to the claimant, the loss is not 'pure economic loss ' gers' permission to be on the train. 80 Consumer protection legislation, however, makes such notices ineffective against people acting as consumers. 81 Consumers are defined as individuals 'acting for purposes that are wholly or mainly outside that individual's trade, business, craft or profession'.
82 For non-consumers (which might conceivably include business travellers, or at least passengers whose business is travel, such as travel journalists), protection is similar, except that instead of the 'unfairness' standard, an older 'reasonableness' standard applies. 83 The 1957 Act applies only to 'visitors', which means those on the premises with permission. Those injured on level crossings without permission to be crossing at the time are not 'visitors'.
84 Fare dodgers are also at risk of being classified as not having permission. 85 At common law, such trespassers had virtually no rights against occupiers, although the rule was softened to some degree in the 1970s. 86 The position was altered, however, by the Occupiers' Liability Act 1984, 87 under which the standard of reasonable behaviour applies in favour of trespassers if the court believes that 'the risk is one against which, in all the circumstances of the case, [the occupier] may reasonably be expected to offer the [trespasser] some protection'. 88 As originally drafted, that was the only condition for the application of the reasonableness standard. It effectively created a discretion for judges to extend the protection of the 1957 Act in cases they thought appropriate. But Parliament added two other conditions: that the defendant 'is aware of the danger or has reasonable grounds to believe that it exists'; and that the defendant 'knows or has reasonable grounds to believe that the other is in the The Place of Tort Law in the Public Transport System vicinity of the danger concerned or that he may come into the vicinity of the danger'. 89 The two additional criteria present potential difficulties. In a level crossing case one can envisage company managers, senior enough to bind the company, 90 knowing that all level crossings are dangerous, that a specific level crossing exists and that trespassers often find their way onto level crossings, but that might not be specific enough a degree of knowledge to result in liability. A claimant might have to show that management knew of trespassing at the specific level crossing at the specific time of day. 91 Dangers to fare dodgers might not even cross the first hurdle of knowledge of the risk. 92 People taking their own lives on the railway might also count as trespassers. Even those with tickets who throw themselves in front of trains from platforms might fall into that category, since they will have exceeded the scope of their permission. 93 The three criteria under the 1984 Act apply. The result on the 'knowledge' criteria might be fulfilled, given how common railway suicide is. But the 'offer some protection' criterion creates a barrier to liability, together with the fact that the 1984 Act, like the 1957 Act, leaves the issue of remoteness or legal causation to the rules of the common law. In English tort law responsibility for suicide is assigned solely to the person who takes his or her life unless the defendant has control over that person's actions and has assumed a specific responsibility to prevent suicide, 94 or the defendant was responsible for the condition that caused the victim to take his or her own life. the premises reasonably safe but also by discouraging trespassers from taking the relevant risk, for example, by keeping them out of the premises or vehicle. 96 iv Common law negligence Where the Occupiers' Liability Acts do not apply, claimants can instead use the common law tort of negligence. 97 Although the 1957 Act applies expressly both to 'dangers due to the state of the premises or to things done or omitted to be done on them', courts currently say that the Act does not apply to injury arising out of 'activity' on the premises. Only the state of premises arising out of the occupiers' 'occupancy' creates liability under the Act. 98 As a result, accidents caused by the way a train was driven, for example, might fall to be assessed under common law negligence. The differences are small -the same standard of reasonable care applies -but might affect cases in which the harm was caused by an independent contractor (for example an outsourced contractor). The 1957 Act says that where the danger was caused by an independent contractor (as opposed to by a direct employee, for whose torts employers are vicariously liable), 99 the employer is liable only if it failed to exercise reasonable care in choosing a competent contractor or in satisfying itself that the work had been properly done. 100 But at common law, employers can be liable for the negligence of independent contractors if the contractor was engaged to do work involving 'extrahazardous activity' or 'special 96 Sec 1(5). Oddly, however, exclusion notices do not work against trespassers since one cannot put a condition on a refusal of entry. The Place of Tort Law in the Public Transport System danger'. 101 That would probably include driving trains if train driving were ever outsourced. Whether it includes activities that are more likely to be outsourced (for example, serving hot drinks to passengers) is less clear, but is possible. Applying the same 'occupancy versus activity duty' interpretation to the 1984 Act potentially produces further protection for fare dodgers, although it seems that common law negligence follows the same three-point test as the Act.
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Common law negligence also applies in other cases beyond the scope of the Acts. It applies, for example, where defendants have no control over the state of the train or infrastructure at the moment of the accident. An important example of a defendant without such control is a regulatory body, including public bodies such as ORR and voluntary bodies such as the RSSB. Public bodies may be sued in private law in England, but they have received favourable treatment in various ways. For example, public bodies, even those charged with rescue functions, have in several cases benefitted from the rule that no duty to rescue or warn exists in English negligence law.
103 They have also benefited from a rule that excludes from the scope of negligence law decisions of public authorities that are so The rationale of the application of this 'pure omission' rule to public bodies is not entirely convincing, since public bodies have no liberty interest to protect and are often receive funding precisely to issue warnings or to carry out rescues. Some judges, however, now insist that there is, or should be, no difference between the application of negligence law to public bodies and its application to private defendants. infused with considerations of public policy that they should count as not justiciable.
104 It is, however, possible to displace these rules if a regulatory body has 'assumed responsibility' for the claimants' safety, an interpretation to which voluntary or private sector regulators such as the RSSB, not being protected by a non-justiciability rule, seem particularly vulnerable.
105
Employees of the relevant organisations if sued as individuals might also not count as occupiers. Although employees might come within the literal terms of judicial tests for 'control' (for example, being able to affect the safety of the premises or to invite visitors onto the premises) 106 they are not occupiers themselves but merely the means by which their employers occupy premises. 107 In any case, claimants rarely pursue employees personally, since, unlike their employers, they are rarely able to pay substantial damages. In addition, although employers are often technically entitled to a contractual indemnity from employees whose torts render their employers vicariously liable in tort, employers' insurers rarely enforce that right. 108 As a result, in practice, although not in theory, common law negligence has little relevance for employees of solvent employers.
Common law negligence also applies where claimants were not personally present on the railway, an important sub-category of which is victims who suffer loss purely as a result of injuries to other victims. The general rule is that secondary victims (victims par ricochet in the language of French law) have no claim. Claims for financial losses are excluded as pure economic loss.
109 Claims for psychiatric injury are deprecated as 'secondary' or 'relational'.
110 Some exceptions, however, exist. Under the Fatal Accidents Acts, some dependants may claim for loss of financial support arising out of a tortious fatal accident (but not out a non-fatal or a non-tortious accident).
111 And a very limited set of persons can claim for secondary psychiatric injury, namely those whose familial relationship with the primary victim was very close and who suffered a sudden shock through personally witnessing either the accident itself or its immediate aftermath.
112 That test generally rules out psychiatric illness suffered by relatives and friends of railway accident victims, since they themselves rarely witness the accident or its aftermath with their own unaided senses. 113 v Product liability A third potentially important form of tort liability relevant to rail safety is product liability. Where an accident occurs because of a failure of equipment to work properly -for example brakes or signalling equipment -legal attention turns not only to those responsible for operating the equipment but also to those who made it. Common law negligence applies to such cases, but so does a regime based on a possibly stricter liability rule, namely, product liability under the European Directive on Product Liability (85/374/EEC) as implemented in the UK through Part 1 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. Producers, principally manufacturers, of 'goods' supplied in the course of a business with a view to profit are liable for any personal injury or non-trivial property damage caused by any 'defect' present in the product at the time it was supplied, defective being defined as 'the safety of the product is not such as persons generally are entitled to expect'. 114 The application of the Consumer Protection Act to railway equipment is uncontroversial. The Act itself includes any 'ship, aircraft or vehicle' within its definition of 'goods'. 115 Infrastructure such as track and signalling devices are also 'goods'. Rolling stock and equipment manufacture is now almost entirely within the private sector and so no doubt arises about whether they are supplied by businesses with a view to profit. Network Rail itself is possibly not a business operating for profit, but it will rarely count as a 'producer' anyway since it manufactures little or nothing itself.
116
A potentially important issue in the context of rail safety is the status of component parts. For example, if an accident occurs because of a failure of a coupling system, is the coupler manufacturer liable or the manufacturer of the carriage or both? The Act lays down, in line with the Directive, that unless the defect was wholly the result of the design requirements of the producer of the main product, producers of component parts may be liable for damage caused by defects in those components. 117 One issue that might become important in the future, as the railway system becomes increasingly automated, is the liability of software suppliers. The current UK view is that objects that include software can themselves be defective because of mistakes in the software but suppliers purely of software not associated with a physical product or medium are not covered by the Act.
118
d A summary of railway accidents and tort liability It is worth bringing together these various tort doctrines and cross-tabulating them with the types of accident reported to be common in the UK rail system (Table 1 ). The table brings out the fact that for the most common, but probably least serious, accidents (trips and falls) the Occupiers' Liability Acts form the primary source of liability. Common law negligence is relevant only to the liability of regulatory authorities and standard-setters, although such liability is unlikely for ORR itself as a public authority. Common law negligence and product liability come into their own in the much less common cases of collisions and in the alltoo-common instances of injuries and deaths of members of the public, although, being mostly suicides, they are unlikely to give rise to liability. The non-suicide public deaths and injuries, at level crossings, for example, might implicate Net-116 The Act (and the Directive) do provide that the first importer of goods into the EU counts as their 'producer' and so the status of Network Rail as a 'business' might arise as an issue through that route. See Consumer Protection Act 1987, sec 2(2). ROSCOs and even TOCs might also count as 'producers' on this ground. 117 Consumer Protection Act 1987, secs 1 and 4 (but note also that component manufacturers are not liable for harm caused by the whole product). 118 The argument is that liability under the Act is limited to 'goods', which, according to sec 2(8) of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and its predecessors 'means any tangible moveable items'. Furthermore, the 2015 Act treats contracts for digital content, that is software not supplied on physical media but downloaded, as a separate type of contract. It seems, however, arbitrary for product liability to treat differently software supplied on a CD and software supplied by download. The Directive itself refers to 'movables', which takes one no further.
work Rail in common law negligence and manufacturers of the relevant equipment might also be vulnerable in product liability. Product liability is also possible for organisations other than manufacturers if they are first importers. 
V Mapping the whole system
We set out not merely to identify the parts of tort law relevant to accidents on the railway but to go beyond that to place tort law in the railway system itself. One way to do that is to think about the processes that lie behind the immediate causes of accidents in terms of layers, as in the Swiss Cheese Model. The first layer, often thought of by lawyers as providing the main causes of accidents, is the interaction between railway staff and equipment ('technical objects') of various sorts, the same interaction that produces the railway's main output, namely mobility. Figure 5 illustrates this layer, adding for completeness the non-travelling public.
Immediately behind the staff and technical objects layer is the layer of organisations concerned with the direct implementation of railway services: Network Rail, TOCs, ROSCOs, contractors and manufacturers. They contribute to the system by managing staff and designing equipment. Errors in management and design can result in accidents, although, as the Swiss Cheese Model suggests, the first layer -staff and equipment -can interrupt the causal sequence and prevent an accident resulting. Figure 6 illustrates these relationships.
Behind the implementing organisations lies a layer of regulatory bodies: DfT, ORR, RAIB and the RSSB. These bodies principally supply information to the implementing organisations about how to carry out their tasks. They do this in two ways -sharing research and issuing standards. Information also flows from the implementing organisations to the regulatory bodies (for example, the RSSB relies on information supplied to it by the implementing organisations) and between rail staff and their employers. In some of these relationships, as far as we can tell, information flows mainly in one direction (for example, ORR to DfT) but in many cases it flows in both directions. Information, or at least data, can flow not only to and from people but also to and from technical objects, which in some cases are designed to send data to their operators. Again, mistakes in information (and standards) can result in accidents, but other layers can interrupt the causal sequence. Figure 7 illustrates some possible flows of information and standards. The precise flows require further research and so this is only a first cut or approximation, but it suffices for illustrating the kind of analysis that could be done. (The public is omitted from this and subsequent diagrams for the sake of simplicity.)
The Place of Tort Law in the Public Transport System Figure 7 illustrates an important point that information flows can be both direct and indirect. ORR, for example, tends not to deal directly with ROSCOs, manufacturers and contractors, but information can flow from ORR to those organisations via the RSSB and the other implementing organisations. Similarly, information from the regulatory bodies tends to reach individual employees (and from employees back to the regulatory bodies) via their employers. Indirect flows, however, might themselves be a source of error. The message might be distorted as it passes through.
Another point illustrated by figure 7 , albeit one open to correction by more precise research, is that information flows from ORR and DfT tend to concentrate on Network Rail and TOCs whereas those from the RSSB and RAIB range more broadly. Adding the two together, more information seems to be flowing into Network Rail and TOCs than into the other organisations. That might be advantageous for safety if the information is correct and useful, but it might be disadvantageous if it is contradictory. The information flows between the regulatory agencies (on the left of the diagram) are thus crucial for system safety, since that is where any errors and contradictions can be corrected.
The law acts as another layer, interacting with the regulators but also acting directly on the implementing organisations and even on individual members of staff (though not on the technical objects themselves). Since we are looking to place tort law in the system, we need to break the law down by doctrinal categories. For legislative and policy purposes it might make more sense to divide the law by enforcement agency or rule-making process than by doctrine but, for the purpose of the questions we set out to answer, doctrinal categories matter.
Law operates in part by transmitting information and standards and it would be possible to add it as a set of elements to figure 7. Law also operates, however, in a less discursive way through creating incentives, mostly of a monetary type (fines or damages) but also by threatening liberty through imprisonment, and since these incentives constitute the most characteristic form of how law operates, we concentrate on them here. Yet again, if the legal layer fails, the other layers might still prevent an accident.
Mapping legal incentives in the railway system produces something like figure 8. Figure 8 illustrates several points. First, as explained above, tort law has in practice little direct effect on individual employees. The incentives of the law important for the behaviour of individuals come from criminal law (including the threat of imprisonment) and contract law in its guise as employment law with its threat of dismissal. Tort law operates more on their employers, the implementing organisations, which it does alongside criminal law and contract. Second, the organisations over which tort law seems to have exclusive influence are public or regulatory bodies which, for reasons already discussed, often escape liability, but of which the RSSB, not being a public authority, is the most vulnerable. Third, if one looks at figures 6 and 8 together one can see that tort law operates indirectly on both employee behaviour and the design of equipment, but it always does so alongside both criminal law and contract law.
Since most of the incentives created by the law are monetary it would be possible to supplement figure 8 with other financial flows in the system. These flows to some extent reflect and reinforce the position in contract law but seem largely to be flowing in the opposite direction from those implied by criminal law and tort. That illustrates a larger and perhaps obvious point that the financial structure of the railway incentivises carrying passengers rather than safety. It would be possible to design the various contracts more to reflect safety concerns, but that level of integration has not yet been achieved and might not even be desirable, given that those responsible for making them might not fully take into account the values and priorities of victims.
Finally, one could combine the four figures to give an overall picture of the system. It would look tangled, but one can simplify to some extent by concentrating separately the different layers. Beginning with employees and technical objects, employees are connected directly to the system by management, information flows, criminal law and contract law and indirectly by other information flows and by each form of law acting through their employers. Technical objects are connected by design processes which are in turn influenced by information flows and standards and each form of law.
Turning to the implementation layer, legal pressure seems at least in principle, without attempting any quantitative analysis (not an easy task given that the different aspects of the law act simultaneously and effectively act as back-up for one another), to bear equally on all the relevant organisations from all three doctrinal sources. In contrast, informational and standards pressure seems more heavily concentrated on Network Rail and TOCs (and thus indirectly on employees), especially from ORR. That combination might in turn justify a hypothesis that regulatory pressure, which one might think of as a combination of information, standards and the criminal law, has greater salience for Network Rail and TOCs than for the other implementing organisations. Tort law is still relevant: it covers more potential claimants than contract law and even where contract law is potentially applicable, for ticket holders injured by the company from which they bought their ticket, tort is the law's preferred route. But the criminal route benefits from the existence of ORR itself, which is organised to enforce criminal law, whereas tort claimants are left to their own devices. Conversely, criminal law pressure on the other organisations (ROSCOs, contractors and manufacturers) seems confined to rarely enforced general offences such as corporate manslaughter. Moreover, contractual pressure on these other organisations consists mainly of loss shifting provisions in their contracts with TOCs and Network Rail, which depend for their effect on underlying tort liability. We might therefore propose another hypothesis, namely, that tort law seems more likely to be significant for ROSCOs, contractors and manufacturers than for TOCs and Network Rail.
Turning to the regulatory layer, the main feature to note is the relative weakness of legal controls. Regulatory bodies are largely sheltered from negligence law, although the RSSB, as a voluntary, private sector body, is vulnerable to actions in tort. But figure 7 shows just how important the RSSB is for the safety system as a whole, and so if tort law has any effect at all on the RSSB, that effect will be multiplied through the system.
In the legal layer itself, one further set of links, not shown in the diagrams, needs to be mentioned, namely the informational or standard setting links between different legal doctrines. Tort law, for example, supplies standards and concepts to criminal law in the form of the requirement for a breach of a tort duty of care in the manslaughter crimes and it supplies the concept of reasonable behaviour to contract. But information and standards do not flow much in the opposite direction: criminal offences are now largely irrelevant to assessing whether tort liability exists, and statutory intervention precludes much contractual analysis of tort liability, at least for consumers. That structure, with tort being a source of standards for other doctrines but not the other way around, suggests a certain degree of dominance or primacy of tort over those other doctrines, albeit one limited in scope.
Finally, superimposing the various relationships brings out the system's problems of co-ordination and consistency. Whether consistency is achieved between tort and RSSB standards, for example, depends on a complex process involving not just the RSSB but also all its members, in a context in which TOCs and Network Rail might care more about ORR's criminal sanctions than tort. Such problems are perhaps inevitable in a complex system, but one benefit of attempting to map it is to make easier identifying where they might occur.
VI Conclusions and further questions
What can we say about the questions with which we started: in what ways and to what extent does tort law function to deliver the goals of the public transport system, and what happens to our understanding of tort law if we treat it as part of a wider system? The condensed answer to the first question is that, at least in the British railway system, tort law, operating alongside and as part of a system of information flows and incentives, seems more significant for the more peripheral organisations in the system than for the organisations immediately concerned with delivering the service.
The answer to that first question should be treated as provisional, however, pending further empirical investigations. The answer to the second question is less provisional or empirical. The main consequence of treating tort as part of a wider system is, perhaps to state the obvious, that instead of asking what the functions or goals of tort law are, we find ourselves presupposing the functions or goals of a wider system and selecting for tort only those functions or goals that contribute to the functions or goals of the wider system. But that in turn raises some further potentially illuminating questions. Some are empirical, such as what role does tort law play in other systems, such as the system of justice or the social security system or the environment? Some are public policy questions, for example, how should we resolve strains and contradictions in tort law that might arise from its playing different roles in different systems? And some are more theoretical, especially whether it makes any sense to ask about the functions or goals of tort law without placing tort law in some wider system? Is tort law better seen not as a system itself but as a component of other systems? Behind that question lies another, one whose presuppositions and implications are controversial but worth taking up on a future occasion. What is the point of asking what the functions or goals of tort law are? Could it be that the question only makes sense in the context of asking how tort fits into other systems?
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